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Illegal but licit
I t ty  Abraham
A housewife in Kolkata buys bhindi (okra) from her neigh-bourhood vegetable seller for her child’s dinner. In doing 
so, she may have participated in an illegal activity. Depending 
on how far back we want to go, the chain of illegality can be 
said to have begun with the Bangladeshi farmer who planted 
the vegetable six months earlier. Or it may be more sensible to 
start with the social ‘commodity chain’ of women who transport 
bundles of vegetables by foot and ferry in the early hours of 
every morning across the hundreds of legal and unmarked bor-
der-crossing points from Bangladesh into India. Crossing with-
out papers or passports, they sometimes bribe border guards to 
let them pass. This is when the first ‘crime’ takes place.
The ‘criminals’ include both the vegetable seller and the state 
border representative. Once in India, some women sell their 
produce to intermediaries in border villages and return to 
their homes in Bangladesh. Others board crowded passenger 
trains to Kolkata and sell their produce at the city’s wholesale 
vegetable market. Then they return home, sometimes stop-
ping to purchase goods with a high resale value in Bangla-
desh and other household items. They reach Bangladesh that 
evening, sometimes bribing border guards again, depending 
on the tacit, socially sanctioned norms that govern this illicit 
flow. Before they arrive home, they may have stopped in a bor-
der village to meet relatives, drink tea and chat with friends, 
and to help arrange marriages for young men and women. 
From the city vegetable mandi (market), mini-wholesal-
ers and retailers fan out into the city’s neighbourhoods, 
sometimes selling directly to consumers who may include 
undocumented Bangladeshi maids working in middle class 
households, who sometimes resell the produce at a slight 
mark-up to neighbourhood shops. This is where the second 
‘crime’ takes place. Clearly no taxes are paid on Bangla-
deshi okra: the ‘criminals’ include the (Indian) vegetable 
sellers and her (possibly undocumented) consumers. This 
is micro-business, comparable to micro-credit in scale, 
and it is not without its dangers. Women, especially those 
travelling long distances alone, risk conducting business 
without guarantees of safety or reliability. Credit is rare, as 
this is almost entirely a cash business, making them vul-
nerable on their return: they may be caught up in random 
police sweeps or threatened by goondas (thugs). What pro-
tects them is the ubiquity of their behaviour and the well-
known social rules that govern their international travel 
and transactions. 
Illicit flows
Illicit movement across national borders takes place world-
wide on a daily basis. Operating in the conceptual and 
empirical gap between these illicit activities and the means 
of describing and understanding them, the research project 
Illegal but Licit (see p.3) does not seek to condone or justify 
the undocumented crossing of national borders or the wilful 
breaking of municipal laws. Our aim, rather, is to understand 
and analyse the linked chain of social activities that violate one 
or another country’s laws. Furthermore, we seek to do so with-
out recourse to the state’s languages of (il)legality or national 
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(in)security. To attempt this is to encroach on the domains of a 
number of disciplines, including sociology, international rela-
tions, economics, geography, migration and border studies. 
All of these fields offer some insights, yet none is complete in 
itself. In other words, the subject of enquiry and our analytic 
approach lie at the margins of national boundaries and disci-
plinary fields. There are, we believe, considerable rewards for 
occupying this interstitial position, not least of them being 
a better understanding of some of the most commonplace 
human activities today. 
What this imagined journey above describes when we consid-
er the tens of thousands of people involved is the vast scale of 
the daily movement of goods and people, cash and commodi-
ties that the city of Kolkata barely acknowledges and yet could 
hardly do without. This combination of unwitting dependence 
and structured invisibility under conditions of transnational 
illegality is characteristic of what we have termed ‘illicit flows’. 
Other examples that make the same point abound. The US 
Border Patrol, driving along the most militarised and high-
tech-defended border in the world, must allow hundreds of 
undocumented Mexican and other migrants to enter the US 
every day – or else the price of daily wage labour rises and Cal-
ifornia’s powerful farm lobby starts to complain. In Jakarta’s 
enormous Pramuka bird and pet market, hundreds of illegally 
trapped birds and animals are openly on sale. And sales are 
brisk: according to one estimate the average trader sells their 
stock in two weeks, which would mean 40,000 wild birds are 
sold to local customers every month. The penalties for illegally 
capturing and trading in protected species are severe but are 
of little effect.
To point to these or other examples is not to argue that the 
world is full of criminals, but that we have not yet begun to 
appreciate the extent to which formal illegality surrounds us 
in the course of our daily lives. It should further be noted that 
people involved in criminality of this order do not consider 
themselves criminals. Of course it could be said, what crimi-
nal does? But the point here is that neither the ‘criminal’ nor 
the consumer of the illegal commodity acknowledges the stig-
ma of criminality in their transactions; they are more likely to 
point to the difficulty of separating crime from licit activity, 
and, by extension, perpetrators from victims. 
The more sophisticated among them will point to the exist-
ence of legally sanctioned spaces where what can only be 
called criminal behaviour flourishes: the tax havens of the 
Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein and the Channel Islands, 
or the maritime ‘flags of convenience’ offered by countries 
like Liberia and Panama, whose sole purpose is to give ship-
ping companies a legal way of avoiding regulations. What 
makes those sites of non-‘criminality’ different from slip-
ping across the border between Burma and Thailand to work 
below minimum wage or buying smuggled Bollywood DVDs 
in Karachi markets? What we are pointing to is more than a 
sharp contrast between social mores of acceptable behaviour 
and the state’s own terms of defining the difference between 
legitimate and illegitimate activity; it is also the difficulty of 
doing so consistently and without recourse to circular rea-
soning. 
The underground and the borderland
A simple matrix (above) can go beyond the contrast between 
socially acceptable forms of criminality, or ‘licit’, and legally 
banned forms of activity, which the state calls ‘illegal’. It is 
useful to think of the social spaces that emerge from this sim-
ple contrast of two idealised forms of authority, one emanat-
ing from the state, the other from society, producing the terms 
legal/illegal and licit/illicit, respectively.  
The left diagonal boxes (A) and (D) are end-points of a contin-
uum, representing spaces privileged by liberal political theory. 
(D) represents a space where neither social nor political rules 
matter: it is nothing but a ‘state of nature’ where individual 
might and illegitimate force rules the day. For the original 
social contract theorists, and for contemporary writers like 
John Rawls, societies seek to move from such ‘nasty and brut-
ish’ places to (A), which represents the ideal political space 
where social norms and political rules mesh seamlessly and 
are indistinguishable. 
Far more interesting (and realistic), however, are the spaces 
represented by (B) and (C). Consider in particular (B), the 
‘underground’ space produced by the intersection of ‘ille-
gal’ and ‘licit’. The underground represents social zones of 
interaction that, though banned by formal political author-
ity, are nonetheless sanctioned and supported by prevailing 
social mores. Among the many sites that can fit this descrip-
tion are physical locations such as gay bathhouses, brothels, 
gambling dens, pornographic video parlours, certain kinds 
of social clubs and coffee houses, and virtual locations such 
as chat-rooms and private list-servers. This space may also be 
represented by mobility, as in the chain of writers, translators, 
copiers and readers who circulated samizdat literature in the 
Soviet Union. What marks these spaces as distinct entities 
are the conditions of entry because, as Igor Kopytoff puts it, 
‘consumers…must first purchase access to the transaction.’ In 
other words, these are spaces that may exist in plain view, but 
in order to get access to their offerings an additional resource, 
usually information, is needed. This resource may be coded 
in ethnic, political, religious, linguistic, social, sexual or class 
terms; the effect is to produce what we call the ‘underground’, 
a space that is set apart from everyday life by these socially 
produced and enforced barriers to entry, and where the writ 
of formal law is suspended. 
Also typical of cell B is the ‘borderland’. If the underground 
is characterised by a temporary dominance of private social 
orders over the legal order, the borderland is a zone where pri-
vately produced social order and formal political rules are in a 
constant state of uncertainty and conflict. As numerous stud-
ies of borderlands have shown, these regions are character-
ised by a complex interplay of power and authority. For those 
living in the borderland, it is a zone unto itself, neither wholly 
subject to the laws of states nor completely independent of 
them. Their autonomous practices make border residents and 
their cross-border cultures a zone of suspicion and surveil-
lance; the visibility of the military and border forces an index 
of official anxiety. Yet the militarised border seeks not only to 
protect the nation from external forces, but to control those 
already ‘inside’. What the Indian political scientist Ranabir 
Samaddar calls a ‘nationalist lament’ emanates among border 
security forces because, as they put it, ‘people here do not 
have the feelings of nationalism so that they would point out 
or tell us who the outsiders are.’ The difficulty of distinguish-
ing insider from outsider produces confusion in the minds of 
state forces that can no longer tell where they themselves are 
located. This uncertainty is a product of the interplay of the 
licit and the illegal, an effect produced by the coincidence of 
the geographic and political limits of the state. 
In summary, this project seeks to draw attention to the inter-
twined nature of the legal and the illegal – the illicit – in many 
cross-border activities, emphasising the conceptual and prac-
tical difficulty of establishing fixed criteria for identifying one 
or another activity as ‘criminal’. Its ultimate goal is to help 
analyse the effects of illicit flows on spaces that are produced 
by the intersection of legitimate social and political author-
ity, and to do so without (circular) recourse to the state’s own 
categories of legitimate and legal. We developed this frame-
work in order to help advance the study of the varieties of 
everyday social behaviour that break laws and cross national 
borders, but which in our view do not constitute ‘criminal 
behaviour’ as conventionally understood. Nowadays, when so 
much activity is described by the all-encompassing term of 
international terrorism, it is important that scholars do not 
unwittingly endorse and participate in the fulfilment of pow-
erful state interests without due reflection and concern for 
human rights. <
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Border crossing at Tachilek, northern Thailand. Here, at the heart of the 
Golden Triangle, legal and illegal flows of goods and people intermingle 
with little regard for official state borders.
Willem van Schendel
A Bangladeshi border 
guard refuses entry 
to people rounded up 
in India and deported 
to the border on sus-
picion of being illegal 
immigrants. 
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